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Weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret evidence
By Gus Van Harten*
Abstract: Since 2001, governments in Canada and the United Kingdom appear to have
increasingly sought to use secret evidence in proceedings against individuals suspected of
posing a security threat, relying on the courts to review and legitimate executive claims in
closed proceedings. Yet, in the face of secret evidence, adjudicative decision-making is
subject to several extraordinary weaknesses. First, the judge is precluded from hearing
additional information that can come to light only if the individual or the public is aware
of the executive’s claims. Secondly, courts are uniquely reliant on the executive to be fair
and forthcoming about confidential information and to characterize accurately the case
for secrecy. Thirdly, the dynamic or atmosphere of closed proceedings may condition a
judge to favour unduly the security interest over priorities of accuracy and fairness. Even
where the use of secret evidence is not deemed to be irreparably unsafe or unfair,
therefore, its admissibility must be premised on the acknowledgement and careful
consideration of corresponding weaknesses in adjudication.
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Introduction

Secrecy is the source of a contradiction in the democratic state. While secrecy may be
essential to the state’s ability to ensure security, it also prevents citizens from making
informed choices about how they wish to be governed. 1 Secrecy may be essential
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because the state must in some cases act in confidence to protect against clandestine
threats; put simply, in the words of a judge of Canada’s Federal Court, “secrecy is
required in order to counter the activities of those who operate in secret”. 2 To entrust
security to the state is therefore to accept a measure of hidden government. Yet by
precluding public scrutiny this trust in the state makes official error and abuse more
likely. Bentham described publicity as “the very soul of justice… the keenest spur to
exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity” 3 and there is no surer spark for
cynicism about government than the knowledge that those in power may lawfully conceal
their activities from outside scrutiny. 4 For this reason, allowances for state secrecy call
for special mechanisms of accountability.

The tensions arising from secrecy inform much of the debate about the relationship
between national security and law. They reflect the underlying conflict of interest in
hidden government whereby those who wield security powers also decide what to reveal
to the public about their mistakes or misdeeds. 5 This article focuses on how this conflict
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has the potential to infect the adjudicative process where secret evidence 6 is relied on,
purportedly for security reasons, in proceedings that affect an individual. Since 2001,
governments appear to have increasingly resorted to secret evidence in cases against
those suspected of involvement in terrorism and, as a result, courts have been asked in
closed proceedings to validate executive claims that an individual poses a security
threat. 7 Such proceedings entail judicial review both of confidential information supplied
by the state and of the state’s arguments for secrecy. The aim of this article is to examine
the limitations of adjudication in the face of secret evidence. The argument is pitched at
the level of general principle and it does not aspire to provide comprehensive treatment of
existing case law in the UK or Canada. Its reasoning is informed more eclectically by a
distillation of academic research and analysis, relevant case law, and the author’s own
experience in the conduct of closed proceedings.

It is accepted here that it is appropriate for courts to decide whether secret evidence
should be allowed in judicial proceedings and, in turn, to assess secret evidence against
the applicable legal standards. In some contexts, especially that of a criminal trial,
constraints arising from secrecy will call for an adjudicator to bar such evidence and to
require the executive either to disclose the information or to withdraw claims based on it.
In other contexts, it may be desirable or permissible to admit secret evidence in light of
such factors as the centrality of the evidence to the underlying case, the degree of impact
on the individual’s rights or interests, and the utility and effectiveness of available
procedural adaptations. Once an initial decision is made that allowing secret evidence is
not irreparably unsafe or unfair, the courts must turn to more specific issues of relevance,
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reliability, probity, and admissibility, and must scrutinize more precisely the rationales
for secrecy so as to decide whether and how portions or aspects of the information can be
disclosed to the affected individual or the public. 8 In the course of a more detailed
review, it may become apparent that the required level of secrecy is such that the original
decision to allow a closed proceeding to go forward should be revisited.

In considering secret evidence, the courts confront three key limitations. First, the judge
is foreclosed from hearing additional information and argument that can come to light
only if the affected individual or the public is made aware of the executive’s claims or the
underlying record of confidential information. Secondly, in closed proceedings, courts
are especially reliant on executive officials to supply and characterize confidential
information and to justify the case for secrecy. Thirdly, the dynamic of closed
proceedings in the security context may condition judges to favour unduly the interests of
secrecy and security. These limitations do not necessarily reflect inherent weaknesses of
courts although they do require that in some legal contexts – in light of the nature of the
evidence and the individual rights or interests at stake – secret evidence must be barred
outright. On the other hand, where the consequences for an individual are less serious,
there is an important role for adjudicative review of the security activities of the state and,
by extension, for secrecy. This role for adjudication as an accountability mechanism
should be endorsed only after consideration of the full range of limitations that follow
from the use of secret evidence. 9
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1. Adjudicative Context

In recent years, the use of secret evidence in adjudicative proceedings involving
individuals accused or suspected of posing a security threat appears to have been revived
and intensified. Without undertaking systematic empirical analysis, this section briefly
outlines indicative aspects of the present use of secret evidence for national security
reasons in the UK and Canada and its judicial review.

A. Contemporary uses of secret evidence

The underlying rationales for national security confidentiality have not changed
conceptually since 2001. These rationales arise mainly from the state’s need to protect the
identity of informers in order to facilitate the gathering of human source intelligence, to
prevent the state’s investigative activities and methods from being revealed to those who
pose a security threat, and to honour commitments made to foreign governments as a
condition of information sharing. These rationales are well known and widely accepted as
providing legitimate bases for secrecy, while also raising the prospect of exaggeration
and abuse. What has changed since 2001 is the sense of urgency that is attached to
relevant threats and also, it would appear, the extent to which secret evidence may be
introduced in proceedings against an individual. 10 This article leaves aside the
extraordinary measures adopted by the US government, including practices of rendition
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and extra-judicial imprisonment, 11 in order to highlight responses in the UK and Canada
that are not extra-judicial, but still irregular and troubling in their reliance on closed
proceedings.

The baseline for further analysis is that the overarching prohibition on secret evidence in
criminal proceedings remains well entrenched in the UK and Canada in that the courts
retain the authority to decide whether the public interest calls for disclosure of evidence
to an accused in order to protect the right to a fair trial. That right itself rests
fundamentally on the accused’s ability to know the case against him or her and to answer
that case by testing the evidence and offering evidence and argument in reply. 12 In the
criminal context, dangers posed by secrecy to accuracy and fairness are often regarded as
irreparable. Secrecy may be permitted in the investigation of alleged crimes in order to
authorize investigative techniques aimed at acquiring disclosable evidence for trial, but it
is rarely if ever tolerated at the trial itself. 13 In contrast, secret evidence has been allowed
in other contexts, including some that lead to long-term detention, most importantly (in
the UK) in proceedings to determine whether a suspected terrorist may be detained on
preventive grounds and (in both the UK and Canada) in proceedings to determine
whether a foreign national may be detained because he or she is believed to pose a
security threat.
Thus, in the UK, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 14 provides for the issuance of
control orders to detain terrorist suspects; in Canada, pursuant to the Immigration and
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Refugee Protection Act 2001, 15 security certificates have been issued for the detention of
foreign nationals. The origins of these regimes differ in that the Prevention of Terrorism
Act 2005 draws on the history of detention powers exercised during the conflict in
Northern Ireland 16 whereas the security certificate regime in Canada remains rooted in
the immigration law of detention and deportation. By extension, the Canadian regime
applies only to non-citizens while the UK system of control orders extends, since 2005,
beyond the immigration context to apply to nationals and non-nationals alike. That said,
both regimes are comparable for present purposes because they allow secret evidence in
order to justify the detention of an individual or the imposition of onerous restrictions on
his or her place of residence, movements, contacts, and communications. While the
degree of encroachment on liberty may vary according to whether the person who is
incarcerated is given the option to leave the country, for example, it is clear that
incarceration in any case has serious consequences for the individual. Both the UK and
Canadian regimes may therefore be viewed as quasi-criminal given the extent to which
they restrict liberty. 17 As the Supreme Court of Canada recently stated: 18

The consequences of security certificates are often more severe than those of
many criminal charges. For instance, the possible repercussions of the process
range from detention for an indeterminate period to removal from Canada, and
sometimes to a risk of persecution, infringement of the right to integrity of the
person, or even death.
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The use of secret evidence to detain individuals has, unsurprisingly, generated
controversy in both the UK and Canada. 19 But this is not the only context in which
secrecy powers have expanded. In Canada, for example, amendments in 2001 to the
Criminal Code of Canada 1985 20 allowed the executive, with court approval, to require a
witness at a criminal trial to testify under oath at a closed investigative hearing in the
absence of the accused. Also in 2001, amendments to s 38 of the Canada Evidence Act
1985 gave the Attorney General of Canada wide-ranging powers to block release in any
proceeding of “sensitive information”, the disclosure of which the Attorney General
believes would harm national security, national defence, or international relations, even
after a court concludes that disclosure would not cause such harm or that the information
should nevertheless be disclosed in the public interest. Thus, there are numerous contexts
in which the executive’s powers to keep evidence secret, although known before 2001,
appear to have expanded. 21

Different procedural contexts in which secrecy powers are exercised, and secret evidence
admitted, will involve different sorts of consequences for the individual who is affected
by adjudicative decision-making. 22 Criminal proceedings obviously carry the prospect of
criminal sanctions. However, administrative proceedings may also entail serious
consequences for the liberty and mobility of the individual, potentially culminating in
long-term detention or deportation, alongside lesser encroachments such as the removal
of one’s passport. 23 Moreover, legal proceedings may have significant consequences for
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the individual without encroaching on his or her liberty or mobility. These include, for
example, orders to pay a fine or damages, the seizure of property, the denial of security
clearance, the acquisition and storage of personal information, adverse findings of
misconduct by a commission of inquiry, or a refusal of access to government
information. 24

It is important to bear in mind the variety of procedural contexts in which the legitimacy
of secret evidence may fall for consideration. Although secret evidence is entirely
inappropriate in some contexts, in others it may be unavoidable or desirable as a means to
facilitate independent review of the workings of hidden government. The circumstances
for and implications of secret evidence also vary depending on the factual and legal
issues at stake. Procedural adaptations of adjudication designed to accommodate secret
evidence may be correspondingly flexible. The question is not simply whether it is
appropriate to allow secret evidence, however vital that question may be. In some
circumstances, it is also important to consider how to adapt the process on an informed
and self-conscious basis where the use of secret evidence is not deemed to be irreparably
unsafe or unfair.

B. Judicial Review

Since 2001, the legal terrain for secret evidence has been characterized by greater
reliance on the courts to approve decision-making processes that involve closed
proceedings and, in turn, to review and legitimate executive claims in such proceedings.
In the UK and Canada, the use of secret evidence remains subject to review by courts or
by specialized tribunals whose decisions may in turn be challenged in the courts. The role
of the courts in this regard is constantly evolving as the different branches of the state
confront and contest the use of closed proceedings in different contexts.
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Thus, in the UK, the issuance of control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
2005 is subject to judicial approval 25 or review 26 in closed proceedings governed by Part
76 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The courts thus play the central role in the decisionmaking process. On the other hand, under the earlier regime of Part IV of the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, a certificate could be issued for the detention of
a non-citizen 27 and the individual could in turn appeal against the certificate to a tribunal
of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), 28 consisting of a High Court
judge as chair, a second member drawn from a panel of judges with experience in
immigration appeals, and a third member who was a lay person with experience in
assessing security intelligence. 29 The SIAC tribunal would resolve the appeal after
considering secret evidence and its decisions were subject to further appeal to the
ordinary administrative law courts. This arrangement for issuing and reviewing
certificates against non-citizens was the subject of the House of Lords’ decision in the
Belmarsh case, 30 which found that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
regime violated the right to liberty and security of the person under the European
Convention on Human Rights on the basis that it was a disproportionate response to the
threat of terrorism and that its application to foreign nationals only, and not citizens, was
unjustifiably discriminatory. 31 In response, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was
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enacted. It allows for the use of secret evidence to detain citizens and foreign nationals
alike, and it replaced the process of SIAC review with one of judicial scrutiny. Control
orders are now subject to judicial approval or review in closed hearings at which relevant
material can be withheld from the individual.

In Canada, much of the responsibility for adjudicative review in security proceedings,
outside of the criminal context, is assigned to the Federal Court, at which a number of
judges have been designated to hear cases in which confidential information is advanced.
This includes, in particular, the review of executive claims in relation to security
certificates issued under ss 77(2) and 78 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
2001, applications for security warrants under s 21(1) of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act 1985, applications to suppress the disclosure of sensitive
information under s 38.04 of the Canada Evidence Act 1985, and decisions to list an
organization as a terrorist entity under subss 83.05(1) and (5) of the Criminal Code of
Canada. Typically, after examining confidential information at a closed hearing, the
Federal Court judge decides whether the information can be disclosed to the individual
by way of partial disclosure or a summary. Notably, although Canadian law after 2002
moved away from the use of a separate counsel to represent the individual’s perspective
in closed proceedings, 32 this changed as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
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decision in Charkaoui No. 1. 33 In that decision, the Supreme Court found that the security
certificates regime was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice that protect
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, in part because the regime did not provide for the appointment of “an
independent agent at the stage of judicial review to better protect the named person’s
interests”. 34 The Supreme Court also cited, among other possibilities, the UK system for
the appointment of a special advocate, drawn from a panel of senior barristers
specializing in immigration and human rights law, whose role is to represent the interests
of the affected individual in closed hearings and who is given access to the confidential
information put forward by the executive. 35

In both countries, therefore, judges are tasked with the review of secret evidence,
alongside any open evidence, before deciding whether to uphold a claim to nondisclosure on national security grounds by the executive. The individual is not denied any
and all opportunity to reply to the executive’s claims. Rather, the individual is denied
access to what may be central aspects of the state’s case and is therefore unable to fashion
a reply and exercise procedural rights in an informed way.

2. The Weaknesses of Adjudicative Review in Closed Proceedings

The conflict of interest that is inherent in hidden government presents a major concern for
adjudication because of the ways in which secrecy tends to undermine truth-seeking.
Three weaknesses in particular confront courts when faced with secret evidence. The first
weakness arises from the denial of access to the evidence by the affected individual and
by the public. The second arises from the courts’ dependence on executive agencies,
including foreign governments, to supply and characterize the confidential information
from which secret evidence is drawn. The third arises from the adjudicative dynamic that
33
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secrecy generates in the security context, which may condition a judge over time to
favour secrecy over disclosure. Each of these limitations is now examined.

A. The absence of the individual and the public

The first set of limitations in closed proceedings arises from the inability of the individual
to present a reply to claims against him or her by probing or elaborating upon the record
and by presenting an informed counter-argument. The court is deprived of the fruits of a
counter-investigation by the affected individual in response to the executive’s case. 36 The
court will not hear exculpatory evidence that the individual alone may be in a position to
supply or uncover. 37 State witnesses will not be subjected to cross-examination in
contradiction of the venerated principle that evidence must be open to denunciation by
the opposing party. Further, the court is denied the benefit of hearing a properly informed
argument from the individual. Thus, core safeguards of the adversarial process are lost. 38

In the absence of the individual party, the judge in a closed proceeding may be compelled
to challenge more directly the executive’s case on behalf of the individual. 39 He or she
may attempt to represent the individual’s interest in reviewing the written record,
questioning state witnesses, and searching for further evidence that might benefit the
individual. This judicial straddling of the line, although necessary, is not a satisfactory
arrangement. The judge is less able to represent the individual than would be the

36
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individual’s own lawyer, first because the judge has no access to information the
individual would otherwise share with counsel in privileged discussions about how to
prepare for and present the case. 40 The judge may not hear whether the accused has an
alibi at a key moment or whether there is some innocent explanation for allegedly
suspicious activity. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui No. 1,
“the judge, sitting alone in closed proceedings, simply cannot fulfill the vacuum left by
the removal of the traditional guarantees of a fair hearing”. The judge “is not in a position
to compensate for the lack of informed scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a
person familiar with the case could bring”. 41 In addition, unlike the individual’s lawyer,
the judge must exercise restraint when probing the executive’s evidence and argument in
order to protect the court’s neutrality.42 A judge can question state witnesses
aggressively, for example, only at the risk of undermining his or her credibility as the
ultimate decision-maker. Because he or she is “the only person in the justice system
whose sole obligation and loyalty is to the defendant”, 43 an individual’s own lawyer is
uniquely positioned to advocate for the individual. 44

A comparison to the criminal context
It might be argued that ex parte proceedings and secrecy are not unknown in the criminal
context and, as such, that restrictions on confidentiality in non-criminal proceedings –
where the consequences for the individual are less serious – should not be discounted. In
particular, doctrines of privilege or public interest immunity in criminal proceedings may
permit the Crown to seek judicial approval to withhold relevant information from the
40
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accused in order, for example, to enable a vulnerable witness to testify, to protect the
identity of a confidential informer, or to protect national security. But however
significantly these doctrines may affect the determination of guilt or innocence in a
criminal proceeding, the cloak of secrecy that they extend is more limited than in other
security-related proceedings. First, it does not extend to the actual evidence adduced at
trial in support of the Crown’s case or to the allegations directed against the individual.
Second, it is subject to tight controls requiring the withdrawal of the charge by the Crown
or dismissal of the case by the court, where the evidence goes to a central issue in the
trial.

Consider the Canadian approach to informer privilege in criminal proceedings. In such
proceedings, the identity of an informer may be withheld from the accused where the
information supplied by the informer was given to police on the express or implied
condition that the informer’s identity be shielded by the executive. 45 This is so despite the
fact that disclosure of the contents of such evidence or aspects of its origins (such as
financial or other incentives given to the informer by the executive) would better enable
the individual to understand and respond to the executive’s claims. 46 Informers may have
reason to fabricate or embellish information they provide, for example in order to avoid
prosecution or deportation, 47 and, without knowing the identity of an informer, an
individual cannot identify reasons – of which he or she may be uniquely aware – that cast

45
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doubt on the informer. Yet confidentiality is accepted, within limits, 48 in order to protect
the state’s capacity to investigate and apprehend criminal activity. Similarly, in noncriminal security proceedings, a primary rationale for secrecy is the need to protect the
state’s ability to establish relationships with informers who have knowledge of potential
security threats by making credible commitments to protect their identity.

On the other hand, informer privilege is restricted to information that arises in the course
of the investigation of an offence, and does not extend to information introduced as actual
evidence at trial. The purpose of information derived from a confidential informer is
typically to allow the police to show reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a search
warrant. The confidentiality of tips thus serves as a means to obtain other, disclosable
evidence for use at trial. While the identity of the tipster whose information provided the
basis for a warrant may be kept confidential, evidence derived from the search will be
disclosed to the accused. Moreover, even at the investigative stage, the courts emphasize
the need for careful scrutiny of information supplied by confidential informers where the
information supports a search warrant application. 49 The Supreme Court of Canada has
indicated that a “bald conclusory” tip by an informer is insufficient to demonstrate
reasonable and probable grounds for a warrant and has emphasized that information from
a confidential informer must be compelling, credible, and corroborated by a police
investigation before the courts will authorise a search. Also, where the credibility of the
informer cannot be assessed because the informer is anonymous or untried, this must be
compensated by the quality of the information and corroborative evidence. 50 Confidential
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information relating to informer privilege is thus approached with caution at the
investigative stage and subject to disclosure if relied on at trial.

In contrast, in other security-related proceedings – including UK control order and
Canadian security certificate proceedings – there is broad scope for the use of testimony
(including hearsay) derived from confidential informers as part of the evidentiary
foundation for the state’s case. In the security field, human intelligence sources
commonly do not take the stand even in a closed proceeding and so they are never
questioned directly and under oath about their version of events. Instead, a security
official testifies as to the source’s story or, in some cases, presents information drawn
from a report from the field officer who had contact with the informer, but who also may
never testify under oath. In such circumstances, the risk of error or abuse is magnified
greatly from that in a criminal trial where the evidence adduced will be disclosed,
although it was derived from a search that was triggered originally by a confidential tip.
Both criminal and non-criminal proceedings share a common security-based rationale for
attempting to balance the competing interests in confidentiality and disclosure, but they
achieve that compromise in very different ways. 51

A second example can be found in the approach to claims of public interest immunity in
criminal proceedings in England and Wales as examined in decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 52 The immunity is typically asserted as a basis for
restricting the duty of the Crown to disclose relevant information to the accused. 53 But
again this involves a decision by the Crown to withhold information that it would
otherwise disclose; it does not extend to the actual use of secret evidence at trial.
51
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Moreover, the ECtHR and English domestic courts have placed a series of restrictions on
the assertion of the privilege in order to ensure the right to a fair and public hearing in
criminal cases. In particular, the ECtHR concluded in Rowe and Davis that the restriction
on the rights of the defence must be “strictly necessary” and that any difficulties caused
to the defence must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the adoption of adequate
procedural safeguards. 54 Also, the ECtHR found non-compliant a procedure in which
“the prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of concealed information to the
defence and weigh this against the public interest in keeping the information secret”.
Importantly, it was up to the judge at trial to determine issues of relevance and disclosure
because it was the trial judge “who saw the witnesses give their testimony and was fully
versed in all the evidence and issues in the case” and because he or she “would have been
in a position to monitor the need for disclosure throughout the trial, assessing the
importance of the undisclosed evidence at a stage when new issues were emerging”.55
Again, these limitations on secret evidence in criminal proceedings are not present in
non-criminal security-related proceedings where the state may withhold its evidence and
detailed allegations from the individual, where the duty of disclosure is less categorical,
and where (as under the Canada Evidence Act) issues of relevance and disclosure are
determined by a judge other than the judge in the underlying substantive proceeding.

The absence of the public
Alongside limitations arising from the absence of the individual is the obvious corollary
that the public also has no access to closed proceedings. The absence of the public is a
significant limitation. 56 It raises accountability concerns in general and more specifically
in security-related proceedings where secrecy is necessarily pervasive and typically
permanent. First, keeping evidence secret means that witnesses will not testify, and
government counsel will not present argument, under public scrutiny and third parties
who may have relevant information – but who will be able to come forward only if made
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aware of the evidence – cannot do so. 57 This poses a risk beyond that present in open
proceedings that the adjudicative decision will be founded on incomplete or inaccurate
information. Revealing the evidence to a representative of the individual (or to the
individual himself or herself) on condition of confidentiality does not address this
concern because it precludes third parties from being informed in follow-up
investigations.

Second, the absence of the public hampers the judge’s ability to look behind the state’s
case against the individual and its reasons for secrecy. The need for systematic secrecy
means that courts are less able to hear from independent experts, for the simple reason
that few outside government are able to develop sophisticated and well-informed
expertise in the field. There are experts, often retired security officials, who can offer
expertise that is informed by extensive experience in the work and techniques of security
intelligence. But this expertise remains concentrated in a small group of persons who
have past connections to government. Even where a particular expert independent of the
security agencies is called to testify on the evidence and the rationales for secrecy in a
particular case, the expert will be shut out from the closed loop of up-to-date information,
examined with reference to other live intelligence files, that is available to the insider.
The executive becomes by default the judge’s guide to the murky world of security
intelligence, 58 tasked with outlining the state’s current priorities in relation to the case
against the individual, its information-sharing practices, the motivations of foreign
governments, the strengths and weaknesses of its investigative techniques, and so on.
This of course does not mean that sensitive information should be released in order to
support the development of a wider base of expertise on security intelligence. But it does
indicate that secrecy in the security context has wider implications for adjudicative
decision-making over and above its impact on the instant case.

B. Dependence on the executive
57
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A second set of limitations arises from the courts’ dependence on the executive, above all
its security arm, to be fair and forthcoming in supplying confidential information, in
depicting how the information was acquired and selected for presentation to the court,
and in producing all information in the state’s custody that may be beneficial to the
individual. In a closed proceeding, the judge is not in a position to review the underlying
record of information held by the executive. As a result, greater opportunities arise for
error or abuse than in cases where a more extensive duty of disclosure applies or where
alternative, independent means of investigation are available. 59

Security agencies assess the reliability of information in order to make decisions about
threats to security and about possible responses. Their mandate is not to assess evidence
against legal standards. In Manget’s words: “Intelligence looks forward and provides an
estimate of what is happening and what will happen. Everyone is guilty until proven
innocent, and innocence does not last”. 60 When confronted with secret evidence,
therefore, a court depends on the executive not only to be fair and forthcoming in its
presentation of the state’s case, but also to adapt its ingrained methods of analysis and
assessment to an adjudicative environment. This opens the door not simply to intentional
abuse but also to unintended error or misrepresentation in the presentation of security
intelligence as evidence.

These concerns are accentuated by documented instances in which the courts’ trust of the
executive on matters of secrecy has been betrayed. 61 A number of instances of the
59
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manipulation of secrecy by government officials in order to avoid embarrassment to
themselves or the government came to light as a result of the Arar Inquiry in Canada. 62
For example, it was revealed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had
previously misled a Canadian court on the likelihood that secret evidence obtained from
Syrian Military Intelligence, and used to support an application by police for a warrant,
was the product of torture. 63 This fact was disclosed publicly only after the Inquiry
released its reports and sought a court order to authorize disclosure over the objections of
the government. The government resisted disclosure, purportedly on security grounds, for
more than two years after the establishment of the Inquiry. The lesson is that, where the
executive misleads a court about secret evidence, the truth is unlikely to emerge without
sustained pressure by an independent entity with detailed knowledge of the underlying
record of the case. Without thorough, independent review of the executive’s claims it will
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be impossible for a judge, let alone those denied access to closed proceedings, to know
whether secrecy powers have been misused. 64

Information supplied by a foreign source
Judicial dependence on the executive is especially problematic where secret evidence
originates in a foreign government. This is not uncommon. A key rationale for national
security confidentiality is the need for the state to honour its commitments (or ‘caveats’)
to foreign entities. This rationale is especially compelling in the security context because
a state is often able to acquire information from other states only by agreeing not to pass
it on to third parties. A state must therefore be able to make credible promises of
confidentiality in order to protect its ability to engage in information-sharing. 65 Yet, for a
court, foreign-sourced information presents special quandaries because it calls for
scrutiny of at least three actors: the original human source, the authorities of the
providing state, and the authorities of the receiving state. Each actor may have reasons to
filter or fabricate information.

The court’s task thus extends to the assessment of foreign entities and sources and of the
likelihood that they may have erred in presenting information, withheld relevant material,
relied on inappropriate interrogation methods, or deceived the receiving state for their
own purposes. In conducting this assessment, neither the court nor its security agencies
may be able to know with confidence how the foreign government acquired or produced
the information or whether it was filtered through third states. For example, who in the
receiving state will be able to say whether a confession by a prisoner in another state has
been coerced or fabricated? An obvious danger is that the foreign government has
actively misled the receiving state; we are speaking of the world of espionage as well as
intelligence after all. The court may not know whether and how the information wound
64
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its way through the security apparatus of other states 66 and may not be privy to the
foreign policy motivations and machinations of the foreign government. 67 The court
cannot call foreign officials to testify and is unlikely to hear testimony from, or even to
know the identity of, informers abroad. The court is thus seriously hampered in its ability
to probe the executive’s case.

The court in the receiving state relies in closed hearings on its own government and,
especially, on the agencies that deal regularly in the information exchange in security
matters. But those agencies have wider relationships with other governments that they
must cultivate as part of their mandate to collect useful information. An agency’s
responsibility to serve the court may be important, but it remains one consideration
alongside others in the agency’s pursuit of its mission to identify and protect against
threats. In the course of this mission, individuals may become useful bargaining chips in
international dealings with other entities. 68 Alternatively, a security agency may be
reluctant to question before a court the reliability or motivations of foreign governments
with which it has an on-going relationship, especially after the agency has chosen to put
before the court information from that government. In these respects, a judge may not
66
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fully appreciate the exigencies of its security agencies’ dealings with a foreign
government that has supplied secret evidence.

Another danger is that officials from different states could seek to manipulate information
exchange in order to construct rationales for secrecy in each other’s jurisdictions.
Because it is the executive that initiates proceedings against the individual, while also
deciding how its information sharing arrangements are constructed and negotiated, the
court should not extend blanket protections from disclosure to foreign-sourced
information nor should it lower evidentiary standards that otherwise apply to the types of
evidence proffered. Doing so opens the door to the artificial use of foreign caveats as a
vehicle to inoculate information against disclosure and against the rigours of the ordinary
legal process. Likewise, where the executive proposes to use foreign-sourced information
as secret evidence, the court should hold the executive to a reasonable duty to negotiate
with the providing state in order to maximize disclosure. 69 The executive’s decision to
agree to a caveat when receiving foreign information could also be taken as an election to
limit the extent to which such information can be introduced in an adjudicative process
against an individual. The integrity of adjudication requires that information-sharing be
adapted to the demands of accuracy and fairness, not the other way around.

The decision in Charkaoui No. 2
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged limitations arising from judicial
dependence on the executive and took steps to address them in Charkaoui No. 2. 70 The
case involved the use of secret evidence that originated in operational activities of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Mr. Charkaoui, a permanent resident of
Canada, had been detained for 21 months pursuant to a security certificate. Prior to a
fourth judicial review of his detention, the government revealed that a document that
should have been disclosed to the court when the security certificate was issued had not
been disclosed due to an oversight. The document was a CSIS report summarizing two
69
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CSIS interviews with Mr. Charkaoui that took place prior to his detention. In reply to Mr.
Charkaoui’s request for disclosure of the notes and recordings of the interviews, the
government stated that there were no recordings on file and that notes of CSIS interviews
are, based on CSIS policy, systematically destroyed after the CSIS officer completes his
or her report. Thus, the judge reviewing Mr. Charkaoui’s detention would have to rely on
interview summaries prepared by executive officials.

In these circumstances, the Supreme Court found that CSIS breached its duties under the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and under s 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms to retain all of the information in its possession relating to security
certificate investigations and to disclose that information to relevant ministers and the
reviewing judge. LeBel and Fish JJ stated for a unanimous Court that submission of the
operational notes of CSIS officers to the court “may be necessary to ensure that a
complete and objective version of the facts is available to those responsible for issuing
and reviewing the certificate”. 71 They concluded also that “[i]f the original evidence was
destroyed, the designated judge has access only to summaries prepared by the state,
which means that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify the allegations” against
the individual. It followed that “the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational notes
compromises the very function of judicial review”. 72 These concerns reflect the wider
limitations arising from judicial dependence on the executive in closed proceedings,
which are further explored in the next section of this article.

C. The dynamic of closed proceedings

Closed proceedings in the security context have a dynamic that is unlike other
confidential adjudication owing to a combination of factors that may encourage the
courts, sometimes in subtle ways, to favour unduly the executive’s position over that of
the individual. This tendency is in part the outcome of the two factors previously
discussed – the absence of the individual and the public, and the courts’ dependence on
71
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the executive – both of which contribute to an adjudicative environment in which the
security interest obtains a privileged status as a result of its more direct and responsive
representation before the court. Besides this, a judge may lean toward the executive’s
position for more diffuse reasons arising from the dynamic of closed proceedings and
from the type of issues that arise in confidentiality review. 73

The atmosphere of closed hearings
In the first place, closed hearings have a unique tone and atmosphere that reflects the
priorities and culture of the security realm. This realm is populated by officials whose
raison d’être is to identify and counter security threats and whose training and
professional experience understandably press them to emphasize secrecy over disclosure,
and expediency over concerns to protect the administration of justice. Other than the
judge and a handful of court staff, closed hearings will be attended by government
counsel, government witnesses, and government observers who are all drawn from or
connected to the security realm. Other than the judge, the only experts (legal and nonlegal) in the room in which the hearing takes place will have exclusive access to and
control over the background information and underlying record for the case. Thus, they
will have incomparably specialized expertise in the most arcane of fields. 74 In these
respects, the executive’s presence looms large, both physically and psychologically, as a
constant reminder of the security interest.

This environment need not influence the judge in an overt or conscious way, but it may
contribute over time to a dynamic in which security and secrecy crowd out other
priorities. 75 One need not suspect that security officials have actively misled a judge in a
particular case in order to accept that judicial review of the executive in these matters is
shaped by how security officials present their activities and vet the information they
collect before putting it before the court, and by their own vulnerability to errors that an
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open process would otherwise deter or uncover. 76 Even where a judge is not swayed by
“nightmarish tales of national security problems”, 77 he or she must confront serious
obstacles to peeling away any layers of obfuscation or to uncovering any subtle bending
of the truth on the part of security officials.

Lack of judicial expertise
A key reason for the courts’ hesitancy to question the executive, especially in its
characterization of the implications of disclosure of confidential information, is the
reviewing court’s acknowledged lack of pertinent expertise. It is a very complex task to
evaluate confidential information or intelligence, predict how its release may harm the
security interest, weigh this risk against the need for openness and fairness, devise ways
to maximize disclosure without allowing the intricacies of document review to
overwhelm the adjudicative process, and regulate compliance by the executive with court
orders to release information. Each of these elements of the process may in turn engage
wide-ranging issues such as the novelty of investigative techniques, the effectiveness of
data-mining software, the conditions of a witness’ imprisonment in a foreign country, the
motivations of a foreign agency to share information, the immutability of governmental
caveats, and so on. 78

In examining these issues, a court must be sensitive to challenges faced by the security
agencies. 79 It is a difficult undertaking to identify and evaluate clandestine threats and
viable responses under conditions of systematic secrecy. This task calls for laborious
collection, classification, analysis, distribution, and prioritization of vast data sets
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collected from disparate sources of varying reliability. It involves targets of investigation
whose networks are evolving, who conceal their aims and connections, and who may be
prepared to exploit the freedoms of a democratic society. It would be difficult if not
simply unrealistic for a judge to become well-versed in the full panoply of threats
associated with diverse organizations, governments, and regions of the world. Indeed, it
may in some cases appear futile for the court to attempt to determine all of the
implications of a decision to release confidential information to the public or to the
individual, in the course of the court’s balancing of competing rationales for disclosure
and secrecy. 80 The recognition by judges of their relative lack of expertise in these
respects explains much of the courts’ tendency to accept executive overtures for
deference in the security field. 81

By the same token, courts “ought not to panic at the mere mention of national security
and abdicate their inherent power in common law”, as Narain puts it. 82 The courts have
their own realm of expertise and a profound responsibility to ensure that the protection of
security does not sacrifice core principles of the administration of justice. 83 Security
agencies likewise do not have expertise in managing the risks of secrecy in legal
decision-making, and their views on whether and how closed proceedings should be
permitted may be influenced by their mandate to counter security threats. There is also a
record of over-claiming confidentiality (as well as selective leaking) in security matters,
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including in adjudicative proceedings. 84 It is therefore important for the courts to adopt
openness as an initial presumption and require the executive to establish compelling
reasons for non-disclosure in respect of particular items of evidence. 85 It is one thing for
a court to defer generally to the executive in security matters; it is another for courts to
accept the state’s confidentiality claims over core elements of its case against an
individual without reviewing in detail the information and proposed rationale for secrecy,
without carefully considering options to maximize disclosure, and without requiring the
executive to choose, where necessary, either to disclose the evidence or to accept
dismissal of its relevant claims. 86 A court neglects its duty to insulate the adjudicative
process from the conflict of interest in hidden government when the court is overly
compliant in accepting what was called, by US Senator Muskie, “the outworn myth that
only those in possession of military and diplomatic confidences can have the expertise to
decide with whom and when to share their knowledge”. 87

The mosaic theory
In terms of expertise, the terrain of inquiry in national security matters has an especially
opaque and high stakes quality. Threats are often not clear even to security officials and
yet can easily be seen by the judge to carry potentially catastrophic consequences. This
high stakes uncertainty provides the backdrop for the “mosaic theory” of non-disclosure.
The theory posits that, even where apparently innocuous information is disclosed, an
informed observer may be able to piece together information or combine it with other
information known to the observer in order to construct a more comprehensive picture of
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state secrets. 88 Underlying the theory is an ultra-precautionary approach to the disclosure
of security intelligence. 89 It can be used to support a claim that disclosure of virtually any
evidence classified as secret by the executive will harm national security. In Pozen’s
words, ‘highly speculative mosaic claims are unfalsifiable; in practice, they have proven
unimpeachable’. 90 The difficulty then is that the theory’s breadth may cause courts to
defer to the state’s confidentiality claims without engaging in rigorous analysis of
whether and how abstract and generalized rationales for confidentiality actually apply to
specific pieces of information. In many cases, courts have relied on the mosaic theory to
support a highly deferential approach to the state’s case for secrecy.91

A sceptical approach to the mosaic theory was adopted by Mosley J of Canada’s Federal
Court in Khadr, which involved an application for the disclosure of information subject
to the national security confidentiality provisions of s 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. In
Khadr, the mosaic theory was advanced by the Attorney General to support a
confidentiality claim over various pieces of information relevant to Mr. Khadr’s defence
in extradition proceedings, including the fact that Canadian officials had been informed
three years earlier that US authorities paid a bounty to Pakistan for Mr. Khadr’s capture
prior to his detention and alleged abuse at the hands of US agents and Pakistani officials.
Following a detailed review, Mosley J ordered disclosure of the information that he found
to be relevant to the extradition proceeding, including the payment of the bounty. The
court found that disclosure of this fact, in particular, would not injure national security
because three years had passed since the information was received by Canadian officials,
the general practice of paying bounties was in the public domain, no human source

88

Khadr, above n. 69 at para 73.

89

D. E. Pozen, ‘The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act’

(2005) Yale LJ 629 at 663-666.
90

Pozen, above n. 89 at 679.

91

eg Henrie v Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee) (1989) 53 DLR (4th) 568 at

578-579. C. E. Wells, ‘CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude’ (2006) 58 Admin
L Rev 845 at 863-866.

30

appeared to be at risk, and the circumstances in Pakistan had changed since these events
took place. 92

Most importantly for present purposes, Mosley J concluded that the mosaic theory,
without supporting evidence, was insufficient to establish that disclosure would injure
national security. He said that “[a]s a matter of logic, the concept has some appeal but
there is no apparent limit to how far it may be taken. Carried to an extreme, the theory
would justify the withholding of all information no matter how innocuous.” 93 Mosley J
also cautioned that “[w]itnesses from the intelligence community may take the mosaic
effect theory as an article of faith, relying upon it as a complete answer to the release of
information they consider sensitive or potentially harmful.” 94 This important ruling
indicates not only the limits of the mosaic theory as an all-encompassing rationale for
confidentiality, but also the capacity of judges to reject over-broad claims about the need
for secrecy. On the other hand, aspects of the decision in Khadr are somewhat
exceptional, for reasons discussed below.

The contest of attrition in security confidentiality review
A judge is usually in a position to release confidential information only after a timeconsuming and often testing interaction with the executive in secret. 95 The process of
confidential document review is complex and laborious. Myriad issues will arise in the
assessment of the relevance of information to the underlying proceeding, the potential
harm arising from disclosure, and the trade-offs between secrecy and disclosure. These
issues will be multiplied by the number of distinct pieces of information that are under
92
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consideration for disclosure. The relationship between reasons for and against disclosure
may be fluid, requiring on-going review as risks evolve or other information finds its way
into the public domain. The process will be cumbersome, all the more so where the
executive adopts the strategy of embroiling the judge or special advocate in a contest of
attrition. 96 In such circumstances, there is a danger that the judge, facing a long and
arduous struggle with the executive, will be discouraged from undertaking the meticulous
scrutiny that is required to maximize disclosure. 97 He or she may be induced to opt for
secrecy as the most practical way to contend with a seemingly endless stream of
objections by the executive.

The Khadr decision is encouraging in this respect, inasmuch as Mosley J ordered
extensive disclosure of information to support Mr. Khadr’s defence in extradition
proceedings. That said, the amount of information at stake was not overwhelming; it
consisted of 266 documents comprising approximately 1300 pages in total. 98 Mosley J
expressed concern about “the length of time that it took to complete the review of the
material for disclosure purposes” but accepted that this was “a function of the sensitivity
of the information and insufficient resources”. He also noted that Crown counsel in the
extradition proceeding “voluntarily undertook to make disclosure beyond the scope of the
requesting state’s Record of the Case when they recognized that there was an ‘air of
reality’ to the applicant’s claims”. 99 Lastly, both counsel to Mr. Khadr and the special
advocate appointed by Mosley J in the case were able to make relatively well-informed
submissions on disclosure because much of the information had been previously (and,
according to the Attorney General, inadvertently) disclosed to Mr. Khadr – and in one
instance to a newspaper – in the course of the extradition proceeding. 100 These pre96
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existing revelations enhanced the adversarial character of the closed proceedings in
Khadr and may have helped to counter other pressures tending to favour secrecy.

3. Conclusion

Three weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret evidence have been elaborated: the
inability of the individual to make an informed reply to the state’s case, the unique
dependence of the court (and the individual) on the executive, and the dynamic of closed
hearings that tends to favour the security interest. These limitations may be intractable,
especially when secret evidence originates in foreign-sourced information. Executive
reliance on such information enmeshes the court in a web of dependencies on persons and
organizations operating beyond its authority and, in many cases, beyond proper scrutiny
by its own security agencies. In the face of these weaknesses, various procedural
adaptations may assist in ameliorating the limitations of secret evidence so long as they
are designed and evaluated in light of the full range of relevant adjudicative weaknesses,
and take appropriate account of the variable characteristics of specific procedural
contexts.

To address the absence of the individual from closed proceedings, governments in the
UK and Canada have allowed for the appointment of special advocates who are given
access to all of the information put forward by the state, and to the closed hearings, and
who are mandated to represent the individual’s interests. 101 This allows for a line to be
drawn between the judge’s role and the individual’s interests, and operates as a check
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(2007)

against closed proceedings drifting towards undue emphasis on secrecy. 102 However,
special advocates cannot resolve other weaknesses arising from secret evidence because
they, like judges, are unlikely to have the institutionalized expertise necessary to counter
the executive’s mastery of security intelligence, and are similarly vulnerable to
obstruction and exhaustion in the contest of attrition over confidentiality claims. 103
Further, special advocates have no “roving commission” to scrutinize the underlying
files, compare cases in order to formulate a wider perspective, or investigate the
reliability of foreign-sourced information, 104 and so they, again just like judges, remain
dependent on the executive in its production and portrayal of confidential information. 105

In its decision in Charkaoui No. 1, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed, alongside the
use of special advocates, the adjudicative models used by the Security Intelligence
102

M v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Special Immigration Appeals Commission

File No SC/17/2002, Open Judgment (8 March 2004) at para 10.
103

Constitutional Affairs Committee, above n. 9 at 56-57; N. Blake, Submissions before the

International

Commission

of

Jurists

Panel,

UK

Hearings,

25

April

2006,

1

http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Blake_transcript.pdf (last visited 16 October 2008) 6-8.
104

Re MB [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin) at para 98, where Sullivan J expressed concerns about

the reliance on special advocates in closed proceedings where the special advocate does not
“examine what was actually known to the Secretary of State’s informant, the Security Service, or
whether any of the closed material on which the Secretary of State based his suspicion was in fact
true”. Ultimately, in Re MB [2007] UKHL 46, a majority of the House of Lords concluded that
the use of closed proceedings in which special advocates were employed could in many cases be
made consistent with the right to a fair hearing in a civil context under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. However, the majority also expressed concern about the
implications for procedural fairness, with Lord Bingham in particular speaking at para 35 of the
“grave disadvantage” for the individual and of the role of the court in specific cases “to decide,
looking at the process as a whole, whether a procedure has been used which involved significant
injustice to the controlled person”. See also para 66 (Baroness Hale) and para 90 (Lord Brown).
On the appointment of special advocates in parole board hearings, see Roberts (FC) v Parole
Board [2005] UKHL 45.
105

Bonner, above n. 27 at 285-286; Forcese and Waldman, above n. 101 at 40-43.

34

Review Committee (SIRC) and by the Arar Inquiry to look behind executive claims and
scrutinize the underlying record. 106 Notably, both of these alternative models allowed not
only for surrogate representation of the individual in closed proceedings but also for
independent review of the executive’s decisions regarding the selection and depiction of
secret evidence. 107 The models also have limitations, but they were in this respect better
equipped than the special advocates model to counter weaknesses arising from
dependence on the executive. In security proceedings, there is a uniquely pressing need
for independent investigation of the underlying record because the material that makes up
the secret evidence will rarely be made public to contemporaries or otherwise scrutinized
beyond the closed proceeding.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that no procedural adaptation can entirely remove the
inherent weaknesses arising from secrecy. Allowing secret evidence poses an inescapable
risk that the court may be denied vital information that can be communicated only if the
affected individual, or the public, is informed of the evidence. Likewise, the only way to
subject those operating in closed proceedings to the disciplines of publicity is to open the
proceedings. For these reasons, the courts must always ask whether, in spite of the
procedural adaptations that may be available to accommodate secrecy, it is nonetheless
irreparably unsafe or unfair to allow it.
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